SuppressingtariffsonEuropeanindustrialproducts overa12-yearperiodwill be the mostt angiblea ndi mmediatec onsequence ofE uro-Mediterranean association agreementsfor MediterraneanPartnerCountries( MPCs). However,the creation ofthe Euro-MediterraneanFree TradeA reas (EMFTAs) isnot agoalinitself, andultimately shouldbeassessed according to the EMFTAs' contribution to achievingthe stated goals ofthe EuroMediterraneanPartnership( EMP)l aunched ass tated int he Barcelona Declaration of1995for the purposeof'strengtheningdemocracyandrespect for humanrights,sustainableandbalanced economic andsocialdevelopment, measurest ocombatp overty andthe promotion ofg reateru nderstanding betweencultures',the 'essentialaspects' ofthe Partnership.
Todate, economic studyo fthe creation ofE uro-Mediterraneanfree trade areashasfocused on the classicalViner [1950] static analysisofthe trade effects ofcreatingcustoms unionsand/orfree tradeareas(the so-called tradediversion andtrade-creation effects,based solely on the changesintrade flows andpricescaused byt radepolicyandi ts effects on the welfareofd ifferent MediterraneanPolitics,Vol.9,No.3 (Autumn 2004),pp.422-458 economic actors involved).
1 Thismodelallows oneto make rough estimatesof the welfareimpacto fthe free trade areaso nthe countriesinvolved applying simpleeconometric techniques(using, for instance,so-called 'gravity models' explainingtrade flows on the basisofeconomic sizeofcountries,geographical distance betweenthemandsometimespopulation andvarious otherstructural variables,whosemainchallenge ist hato fd erivingthe demanda ndsupply functions,namely,to estimatethe price elasticitieso fd emanda ndsupply,a very arduous exercisei ndeed inl ess developed economies).
2 Still,such models areb ased on (implicit) unrealistic assumptionss uch asfull employment andi nstantaneous adjustment.
3 However,leavinga sidethe questionableuseofthosemethodsasaconsequence ofthe lack ofreliability (andoftent he unavailability) ofe conomic data, economists havef ocused almost exclusively on the impacto fE MFTAso neconomic flows (notably trade andinvestment flows)assuch andmacroeconomic variables,a ndthere hasbeenincredibly littleattention paid to the effects oftrade liberalization in terms ofemployment,incomeofvarious socialgroups,socialservices,prices ofconsumergoods,livingconditions andlevels ofpoverty andultimately the regulation ande xerciseofsocialande conomic rights. Ino therw ords,the MPCshaveagreed to the EMFTAswithoutathorough ex-ante assessment of how theyareg oingto affectthe liveso fpeoplei nt hosec ountries.
Onthe otherhand, analyseso fsocialandeconomic rights havetended to focus on anarrowl egalapproach, 4 emphasizingthe ratification of internationalconventions andtheirr eflection inn ationall egislation,b ut oftenn eglectingtheiractualapplication inp ractice, the marked dualism reigninginthosesocieties(typically,socials ecurity coverage hereislimited to between20and50percent ofthe population -see Loewe[2003] , Table2), or the causall inkb etweeneconomic policiesandsocialconditions.
Thiss tudydoesn ot pretendto fill theseg aps,b ut itdoesintendto take a mored irectapproach to measuringthe impacto ftrade liberalization on people's welfarebyundertakingapreliminary,mostly qualitativeanalysisof how the creation offree trade areasmightaffectthe economic andsocialrights ofpeoplei nt he MPCst hrough theirimpacto neconomic andsocial conditions. Thisemphasiso neconomic andsocialr ights isw arranted byt he factthat,ifhumandevelopment isa'process ofexpandingpeople's choices', economic andsocialentitlements arethe mainvehiclefor achievingit. Atany levelo fd evelopment,the three mainentitlements 'areto livealongh ealthy life, to acquireknowledge andto possess resourcesnecessary for decent life' [UNDP,2003b: 17] .For the latter,h avinge mployment iso ftenanecessary requirement,h ence the emphasisont hisr ealization ofthe rightt ow ork.
Afters uch ageneralassessment,the studywill makespecialreference to the caseofMoroccoandhow different economic andsocialvariablesareto be affected bythe implementation ofafree trade area withthe EuropeanUnion.
Finally itwill explorepossiblenationalpoliciesandaccompanyingmeasures withint he frameworkofthe Euro-MediterraneanPartnershipitself, which couldreduce the expected negativesocialeffects off ree trade areasand contributeto theirsuccess. Thisstudyendswithabrief appendixadvocating the establishment ofaE uro-MediterraneanSystemo fR egionalSurveillance ofEconomic andSocialRights ande xploringways ofd oingi t.
The timehorizon considered inthisstudyisthe transition periodagreed on for the establishment ofthe Euro-Mediterraneanfree trade areas,thatis,12 years from the moment every association agreement entered into effect. Of course, the generalframeworksetout inthisessayneedstobe developed through specific country studiesbased on directempiricalevidence from those countriesw hereE MFTAshavea lreadybeeninexistence for alongperiod. Tunisia isthe country wheretariff dismantlinghasbeeninforce the longest, enteringits ninthyearin2004andatastage wherethismightbegintohurt its nationalp roduction. 5 Morocco,a st he secondc ountry to follow the EMFTA path, begant oapplyt he trade liberalization schedulei nMarch 2000,so itis now only inits fourthyearo fimplementation.
Although the InternationalCovenant on Economic,C ulturalandS ocial Rights andthe very natureofthe rights itestablishess tress the rolea ndthe responsibility ofthe statea sag uarantor ofthoserights,b ei tt hrough regulation or budgetary measures,thisstudywill not address questions related to the efficiencyo fsocialexpenditure(how socialexpensest ranslatei nto bettereconomic andsocialr esults),h oweverimportant thism aybe, since therei sn or easonw hyt rade liberalization (whicha ffects mainlyp ricesand quantitiesimported ande xported indifferent sectors) shoulda ffects tate efficiencyinany way( the latterdependingon institutionalfactors).
AnAnalyticalFrameworkfor the SocialImpactofTrade Liberalization?
The essaydeliberately refers to the 'socialimpact' ofE MFTAs,not to their effectso neconomic andsocialr ights ass uch (asenforceablelegal entitlements). Beinga neconomicss tudy,i tdeals withsocialande conomic conditions. Of course, the people's socialande conomic situation,market conditions such aspricesandsupply anddemandofgoodsandservices,andthe financialcapability ofthe state, all haveadirectimpacto np eople's human rights. Thus,unemployment andlow income-or asubstantialincreaseof pricesofbasic goods-mightaffectthe righttoanadequatestandardofliving, anabsoluteor relativedecreaseofexpenditureon education mightaffectt he righttoeducation bymakingschools andteachers scarce or byaskinghigh fees evenfor public education,a ndso on. Int hiss ense, the studyu ndertakesa preliminary stepint he analysiso fthe impacto fE MFTAso neconomic and socialrights,but the variablesconsidered areatbest indicatorstobe used for ECONOMICA ND SOCIAL RIGHTS IN THEEMP assessingthe rights themselves(whichbytheirvery naturearelegalconcepts), not the rights ass uch.Indeed, the factt hatincomei sdiminishedd oesn ot in itselfprovidea ny proofthatt he rightt oanadequatestandardoflivingi s beingviolated, nor doest he facto fnot findingajobi nr elation to the right to work.
Dueto the multidimensionalnatureofeconomic andsocialconditions and the ontologicalimpossibility ofreducingthemtomonetary values,thereisno analyticaldevicea vailable 6 for undertakingaquantitativea nalysiso fthe impacto ff ree trade on them.
7 Inaddition,the micro-economic natureof economic andsocialconditions (located att he levelo fi ndividuals) prevents the kindofa ggregatea ssessment typicalo fmacroeconomic analysis. This leavesuswithno alternativebut to adopt a'scoreboard'approach, articulating our analysisbydefiningandmonitoringasetofkeyindicatorsofthe evolution ofeconomic andsocialconditions. Thishasamajor drawback: since the only measurablevariablewecanuseconsistsofthe results ofpolicies,itmakesit very difficult,ifnot impossible, to make an ex-ante quantifiedanalysisofthat impact. Ont he otherhand, withint he frameworkofaregionalintegration process such asthe Euro-MediterraneanPartnership,thisapproach lendsitself to easy inter-country (or inter-regional) comparisonsallowing'benchmarking'p rocessest om easurea dvanceso vert imea nde valuatepoliciesin comparativeterms.
The mainv ariablest obe monitored inr elation to economic andsocial conditions arethe following:
. employment (jobc reation andj obd estruction);
. employment conditions (regulation andnatureofe mployment);
. incomeofthe poor;
. public socialexpenditure(which determinest he levelo fe ducation and healthprovision andsocialinsurance,andto agreatextent the standardof livingofthe poor asw ell). Inpractice, the EMFTAsamount to unilateraltrade liberalization byMPCs. Mediterraneanm anufactureshavea lreadybenefited from free access to Europeanindustrialm arkets since the formert radea ndc o-operation agreements signed int he late1970s betweent he EuropeanEconomic Community andtheseM editerraneancountries,a ndthe newassociation agreements exclude all othersectors (notably agriculture)from free trade.
Soinordertostudythe effects ofEMFTAs,giventhattheydonot openup any newexporto pportunity for MPCs, 9 the focus shouldb eon tariff dismantlingaloneandits impacto neconomic activity andsocialconditions. Duringthe 12-yeartransition periodprovided for inassociation agreements, 10 the implementation ofthe EMFTAsw ill havef our immediatee ffects:
Itwill reduce staterevenuebythe amount currently perceived on European products beingi mported into thosec ountries.
. The imports ofi ndustrialp roducts from Europeanfirmsw ill increase thankst ot he reduction ofi mport pricesbroughtaboutbyt ariff dismantling, eitherdueto anincreasei nn ationaldemandf or those goodsorbydisplacinglocalandmoreexpensiveproduction,or both;this will negatively affectthe trade balance ofthesecountries,which, withthe exception ofthe oil-producingcountries,alreadyrun important deficits in theirt rade balancesw iththe EU, revealingalack ofc ompetitiveness (see Figure1) ; int heory,the importation ofc heaperinputs andc apital goodsmightreduce costsfor localfirmsandenhance theircompetitiveness andso increasee xports asw ell,b ut the relativelevels ofprotection for thoseinputsandcapitalgoodswerealreadyquitelow inmost ofthe cases, so thisindirectp ositiveeffecto nexports will necessarily be limited.
FIGURE1
TRADE BALANCEW ITHTHE EU (1998-99) .
Itm ightr educe the priceso fi mported consumption goods,so increasing the realdisposablei ncomeofpeople.
. Itwill destroy employment assomelocalindustrialfirmswill be unableto competewiththe imported products att ariff-free pricesandwill haveto reduce theirproduction or closealtogether. Thiswill entailaloss ofjobsin thosenon-competitivefi rms. Int heory,the competitivepressureon local firms andthe technologys pill-overinduced byt radeliberalization and eventually foreigndirectinvestment couldopenu pnewo pportunitiesfor jobcreation inmoreproductivesectors,but atbest thiswouldtake several years to happen,andi nany casei tisu ncertain.
The magnitude ofthesee ffects will be af unction of(i)t he degree oftrade protection beforethe elimination oftariffs(the higherthe tariffratescurrently applied,the biggert he adjustment cost caused byt heirelimination; trade protection levels ofMPCsareamongst the highest inthe world;see Figure2); (ii)t he pricee lasticity ofd emandf or imported products (inl ess developed countries,i tt endst ov ery high); (iii)t he competitiveness oflocalindustry; (iv) the current reliance on internationalt rade taxesasasource ofstate revenue(see Figure4) ; and(v) the initialeconomic andsocialsituation ineach country (for example, macroeconomic performance asmeasured byindicators such ast he fiscals tance or balance ofpayments; socialindicatorss uch as unemployment rates,d emographic dynamics; externaldebt,e tc).
FIGURE2 TRADE RESTRICTIVENESSO FM PCS AND EU SOCIAL IMPACT OF EURO-MED FREETRADE AREAS
Asalreadymentioned, itistruethattheseeffects canhardly be quantified inadvance (andinany case, itmustbe borneinmindthatevenwhenthereis dataavailable, any quantitativeestimation regardingless developed countries ispurely tentative). However,thisdoesnot detractfrom the strongrelevance ofthatanalysisfor policy:withoutitthe EMFTAscouldendup destabilizing the wholeregion still further.
Employment andE mployment Conditions
The first-ordereffects oftariff dismantlingwill probably fall on salaried employment andwages. Itisn earlyimpossibleto seriously estimatethe magnitude ofjobdestruction dueto anincreaseinimported industrialproducts substitutinglocally manufactured goods. Measuringc ompetitiveness (and hence productivity levels)inless developed countriesisahopeless exercisein creativeeconomics. Inspiteofthis,itisclearthatthe netimpactonemployment ofEuro-Mediterraneanfree trade areasisgoingto be negative, atleast duringa longfi rst stage andprobably not only int he privatesector:a st he stateloses revenues,therewill be pressureto reduce its own workforce andthatofstateowned companies. Ont he otherhand, the theory ofe conomic integration predicts thatlabour adjustment will happenasemployeeswholosetheirjobsin less competitivei ndustriesm oveto newjobscreated int hosethataremore competitiveandbenefitingfrom the newtariff-free access to foreignmarkets.
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But thiscompensatory movement will not take place inMPCs:all potential benefits from preferentialaccess to Europeanmarkets werealreadyachieved inthe late1970s andthe 1980s,andthe newEMFTAsdonot providefor any newt radepreference or opportunitiesfor thosec ountriesinexchange for openingup theirmarkets to Europeancompanies. Underthesecircumstances, thereisnoeconomic reason whythereshouldbeany increaseinthe flowsof foreigndirectinvestment (FDI).
12 Labour adjustment will haveto be absorbed eitherbythe public sector or bythe informaleconomy(whereactualwagesare oftenbelow the legalminimum wage)orelselead to asignificant deterioration ofincomefor peoplelosingtheirjobswithno alternativeathand.Overall itis safe to anticipate'alongperiodofh igh unemployment ratesaftert he launchingofe conomic reforms',a shashappened evenins uccessfully globalizingcountrieswiththe best economic policiesthat'canrealistically be expected' [Rama, 2001:20] .
Figure3showsafirst approach to employment vulnerability to free trade inMPCs:the highert he unemployment ratest hatac ountry isalready suffering, 13 andthe higherits trade protection against imported products,the morei tw ill sufferdueto tariff dismantling.Thefi gureshowst hatitisin Maghreb countries,wheretrade liberalization hasbeengreatest so far (especiallyinTunisia andMorocco),thatemployment will sufferthe greatest andoccur mostquickly. Yet,the realproblemisoneoftiming: thisnegativeimpactonemployment occurs att he sametimea st hosec ountriesexperience the last stage of demographic transition. Thus,labourdisplacement caused byt he EMFTAs will take place inavery tightemployment environment. Withunemployment ato ver1 5percent ofthe labourforce, MiddleE ast andN orthA frican countriesarealreadysufferingthe highest average unemployment ratesofany region int he world [ ILO, 2004: 41] .
Furthermore, thisp roblemiscompoundedb ydemographic dynamics. Although mostMENAc ountrieshavea lreadycompleted the demographic transition (birthrateshaveb eenr educedto levels compatiblewithamodest population growth), 14 the extremeyouthofthe population's age structure (one-thirdofthe 240million inhabitants ofMENAcountriesareunder15)will translatei nto big increasesinp opulation ofworkinga ge duringthe coming two decades. Inoneofthe mostconservativeestimatesofjobcreation needsin the MediterraneanPartnerCountries,FEMISE hascalculated [Handoussaand Reiffers,2003:1-8] that,inorderjust to keepunemployment ratesatcurrent levels,MPCsshouldcreatearound20 million jobsbefore2010 and34million jobsbefore2020. Thisassumesmaintainingcurrent activity rates(only 48 per cent ofthe population ofworkingage iscurrently part ofthe labourforce, and thisfalls to 25percent inthe caseofwomen),which wouldmeaneffectively the vast majority ofwomenremainingunemployed. 15 Still,thesecalculations don ot take into account the anticipated retrenchingofruralemployment (whicha mounts to 30 percent ofthe totall abourforce int he region,a nd SOCIAL IMPACT OF EURO-MED FREETRADE AREAS 45 percent inthe caseofMorocco) duringthisperiod.Evenif thisincredible rateofj obc reation werea chieved,thisw ouldstill meananincreasei nt he absolutenumbero funemployed peoplef rom eightm illion to 12 million peoplei n2 010andto 16 million in2 020. 16 Attendingto thesej obc reation needswill meanincreasingthe workingpopulation inthe region -thatis,the totaln umberofjobs-b ymorethan50p ercent int he next 10 years,which wouldrequirethe current levels ofe conomic growthto be doubled atl east (between1980and2001,MPCsgrewatanaverage yearlyrateof2.4percent), 'anaccomplishment ...not evenachieved bythe high performingEast Asian economiesduringthe heightoftheiremployment growthperiods' [Kellerand Nabli, 2002:1] .Takingi nto account the wideningc onsensus on the fact that' the greatest singlei ssuef acingthe economieso fthe MiddleE ast and NorthAfrica isthe challenge ofemployingits peoplei ngoodjobs',the lack ofa ny proactivestrategyt odealw iththisenormous challenge int he frameworkofthe Euro-MediterraneanPartnershipiso neofi ts most astoundingf eatures.
Inasmuch asEMFTAsarenot truly reciprocal,b ecausetherei sn o correspondingliberalization ofagriculturalexports to the EU inexchange for openingup MPC markets to Europeanindustrialproducts,the best thatcanbe said isthatEMFTAsarepotentially damagingto the MPC economiesandwill donothingto alleviate, letaloneimprove, theirs ocials ituation. 17 However,trade liberalization will not only affectemployment levels,b ut also conditions. The creation offree tradeareaswiththe EU isconsidered asa first stepfor integratingM PC economiesinto the worlde conomy,akindof dress rehearsalfor globalization. The competitivepressurest hosec ountries will be subjected to will pushf or a'liberalizing'r eviewo ftheirs ocial protection systems which couldlead to reformsthatwill furtherdiminishthe socialande conomic rights oftheirp opulation (andparticularly ofworkers). Asstated inoneofficialreportofthe MoroccanMinistry ofFinance, inthe new opencompetitiveenvironment 'the liberalization ofexchangesandthe growth ofexports will only haveapositiveimpactonemployment inthe framework ofabiggerflexibility ofthe labourmarketwhich reducesthe costs supported byfirms' [Hamdaoui, 2002:21] .
Income(WagesandO therwise)
The competitivepressuresthatlocalfirms will experience will induce themto replace permanent workers withtemporary staffwhowill enjoy fewerbenefits (thiss hiftw ill be made easierbyr eforms to labour laws introducingmore flexibility into workrelations andmakingfi rms morec ompetitive). Atan aggregatelevel,the deterioration ofthe balance ofpayments will force devaluations. Inturn,thiswill generateinflationary pressures,andinsofaras economic authoritieswill try to containthemthrough tightmonetary policies, ECONOMICA ND SOCIAL RIGHTS IN THEEMP therewill be anegativei mpacto nr ealincome(reproducingaremarkably similarmacroeconomic policyscenariotothe onecreated inthe 1990s under structuraladjustment plans). Inhighly unstableandrigid competitivemarkets, itisnot clearthatdevaluation wouldlead to animmediatereduction ofimport demand, since many small andmedium enterprises(SMEs) will havealready beenforced out ofthe marketaltogetherbyt he flow ofcheaperimports.
Certainly,a ccordingto the standarde conomic theory ofi nternational trade, globalization (thatis,f ree internationalt rade)s houlde qualizef actor pricesacross countries,b ringinga bout ac onvergence ofwagesl evels and thereforeanincreaseinaverage wagesinless developed countries. 18 However, thisiso nly the theory. Inp ractice, salaried workers are, inm any respects,a privilegedg roup inl ess developed countriesande njoy so-called situation or locationalrents thankstotheirrelatively high capacity for socialmobilization. Int he context ofthe high unemployment ratest ypicalo fundeveloped economies,salaried workers sharethe benefits oftrade protection withthe owners oflocalfirms. Therefore, suppressingprotection maydeprivethemof thoserents andinduce af all int heirw ages.
Empiricalstudieso flabouradjustment to trade liberalization inMaghreb countries [Currie andHarrison,1997 on Moroccos ince 1983 ElWeriemmi, 2003 on Tunisia since 1986 show that,i nt hosec ases,the impacto ftrade liberalization wasn ot absorbed through aggregatej obd estruction,b ut rather byo therm eans,i ncludingafall inr ealw ages( andprofits),i ncreasesin productivity insomesectors,apartialsubstitution ofqualified employment for unqualified employment andafeminization ofthe occupiedpopulation.
Finally,the impactofany loss ofemployment andincomewouldbemagnified byt he domestic multipliereffect,i ncludinga nadditionall osso ftaxr evenue for the stateasmoreworkers losetheirjobsandgointothe informaleconomy.
Priceso fC onsumerGoods
Onepossiblepositivei mpacto fE MFTAso nl ivingc onditions couldb ea reduction int he priceso fi mported consumergoodsbenefitingf rom tariff dismantlinga ndleadingto anincreasei nr ealincomea ndwages. However, thisissubjecttotwo qualifications. Ononehand, the consumption oflegally imported goodsinthe MPCsisoftenlimited to the middleandupperclasses (asr egardsl owerclasses' consumption,thisiso ftent hrough smuggling channels andthereforenot subjectt ot ariffs),meaningthatt he poor will hardly benefitfrom price reductions. Ont he otherhand, the expected deterioration ofthe current account balance will probably endup forcing thesec ountriest odevaluetheircurrenciesagainst the euro. Otherwise, the openingup oftheirm arkets couldb eunsustainable.The devaluation will be aready-made wayt ocounterbalance the loss ofprice competitiveness in localm arkets caused byt rade liberalization,a ndso aprobablereaction SOCIAL IMPACT OF EURO-MED FREETRADE AREAS ofe conomic authoritiest ot he pressureso fE uropeanp roducts.Dueto downwardsinelasticity ofi mport demand, the scopeofthisdevaluation mighthaveto be evenbiggert hant he reduction inimport prices,leading effectively to aloss ofrealincomebythe population (includingthosepoorer sectors thatw ill haveto payhigherl ocalcurrencyp ricesfor smuggled goods). Finally,apossibility not to be ignored ist hatEuropeanfirmsw ill manage to profitfrom the tariff reduction byincreasingtheirexport pricesto MPCsbychoosingto charge higherp ricesinsteadofe xpandingtheirs ales. Int hatcase, the only effecto ftariff dismantlingwouldb eanett ransfero f revenuef rom MPC governments to Europeanexporters,without any other effecto np riceso rconsumption (wherebyt he impacto ftariff dismantling wouldb epre-empted).
Public (Social) Expenditure
The implementation ofEMFTAswill giveriseto bothaloss ofstaterevenues (the average volumeoff oreignt rade taxesfor southern Mediterranean countriesdid increaseslightly from 4.2 percent ofg ross domestic product (GDP)in1989-90 to 4.3 percent in1999 -2000) andanincreaseinthe need for public expendituresinareass uch ass ubsidiest os upportt he adjustment costs associated withthe privatesector restructuring, trainingandeducation to improvethe quality ofthe labour force, andbasic infrastructurestosupport the competitiveness ofthe privatesector itself.Further,all ofthismust be placed inaninternationalcontext withstrong(financial) disincentives 19 for running increased public deficits withthe resultant cuts ins tatee xpendituresino ther sectors (the socials ector will be the primevictim) or anincreasei nt ax revenues. Asgovernments feelt he pressureto raisetaxes,the quickest and politically less disturbingwayo fd oingso ist hrough anincreasei nindirect taxesonconsumption,such asvalueadded tax(VAT)orexcisetaxes. 20 Yetthe increased weightofindirecttaxesonmassiveconsumption goodsreducesthe realdisposablei ncomeofthe poorest sectors ofthe population andh asa negativei mpacto nincomed istribution.
Takingi nto account only the directimpacto ns taterevenuethrough the loss oftariff receipts, 21 the magnitude ofthisbudgetary vulnerability to free trade, estimated atbetween1and4percent ofGDP dependingon the country [Abed, 1998 ], canbe represented, asinFigure4.
22 Lebanon isthe country that appears to be the mostvulnerableto the loss ofcustoms duties,since the size ofits public debtmeans thatitmust devotemorethan17percent ofits GDP to servicingthisdebt. Theweighto fthe wage bill for public employeesis anothernon-discretionary expenditurethatmakesthe statebudgetless flexible inmany ofthesecountries(inMorocco,wagesinthe public sector amount to morethan40percent ofthe totalstateexpenditure). Tunisia andSyria, atthe otherendofthe vulnerability spectrum,arebest placed to accommodatethis loss offiscalrevenues(inthe formercase, thisismainly dueto the successful implementation ofa lternativerevenuesourcesbeginningi nt he early 1990s, andespecially VAT). Indeed, overthe last decadetrade taxeshaveincreased or remained constant inall the MPCsexcept inthe casesofTunisia andEgypt, illustratingtheirdependence on tariff revenuesasasource ofpublic finance. Yet,'whilethist rade liberalisation iso ngoingon anumbero flevels,M PCs havenot moved withconcreteplans -withthe exception ofTunisia -to make up for tariff revenuelosses' [Nashashibi, 2002:10] .
The InformalEconomy
The informalo rn on-registered economyiso ftenanescapevalvef or social ande conomic pressuresinl ess developed countries. Int erms ofsocialand SOCIAL IMPACT OF EURO-MED FREETRADE AREAS economic conditions,itcanhelp to givepoor,unemployed peopleasource of income(howeversmall) andso improvetheirlot. Inthe short term,turningto the informaleconomyisasurvivalstrategyfor the displaced or excluded, but from asystemic point ofviewitisalso apathto permanent exclusion from socialprotection andrecognition (withaparticularincidence inwomen,asthe femaleproportion inthe informaleconomy iscloseto 50percent,whereasin the formaleconomy itt ypicallydoesn ot exceed25percent). Thei nformal economy acts,inaddition,asaconveyorbelt for higherinequality,dueto its typically low productivity levels andwagesorincome(strengthening dualism asatypicalfeatureofless developed economies). Thishasv ery serious and depressingimplications for the futureprospects ofwidespreadincreasesinthe standardofliving.
Overall,therei sl ittled oubtt hatt he economic transition,which the financialande conomic basketo fthe Euro-MediterraneanPartnershipin generalandthe EMFTAsinp articularp urport to bringa bout,requires reducingthe scopeofthe informaleconomy,i np articulart oensuref airand equalcompetition for all economic actors inthe marketplace andto makean expansion ofthe privatesector possible.Howevert he paradox ist hat EMFTAs,a st heyhaveb eendefined int he association agreementsanda re beingimplemented, areactually likely to contributeto wideningthe scopeof the informaleconomy( int erms ofthe proportion ofthe labourforce thatit employs),atleast inthe foreseeablefuture.Itissafe to predict,undercurrent conditions,thatthe informaleconomywill actasaninitialshock absorberfor the impacto ff ree trade, but 'the consequence oflabourabsorption int hese SME branches( includingpetty trade, otherp ersonalandrepairs ervicesand small-scaleconstruction) atarateexceedingthe expansion ofdemandfor their output will be increased underemployment andfallingworkerincomes' [Hunt, 2003:21] . 23 Ont he otherhand, atl east part ofthe informaleconomyitself (especiallythe smugglingofforeigngoods) andthe incomeitgenerates,will also be adversely affected byt rade liberalization,since the reduction ofthe difference betweeninternationalandnationalp ricesw ill be anincentivef or illegalt rade flows to 'surface'.
Of course, onealternativeto the expansion ofthe informaleconomyisan increasei nm igration.
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Poverty andLivingC onditions
Although Arab countriesgenerally havelowerl evels ofpovertyt hano ther groups ofless developed countries,inthe caseofthe formerpovertyismainly linked to unemployment ratesinu rbanareasandto the proportion ofrural population (wherepovertyismorewidespread),withlivingconditions ofthe poor dependingon the levelofinvestment insocialinfrastructure.Bothseem poised to sufferdeterioration asaconsequence ofthe implementation offree trade areas,a ndtherei sarealdangert hatt he progress achieved inp overty reduction inthe 1970s andthe 1980s will be reversed.Actually,inmostMPCs thisalreadyhappened duringthe 1990s asad irectconsequence ofstructural adjustment programmesandi tm ightw orsenasEMFTAsarei mplemented. The pictureinthisfieldcouldhardly be grimmer:asstated inareportonthe economic situation ofthe region [ERF, 2002] , 'realwageshavefallen,income inequality widened andunemployment,e specially amongthe young, has risen. HouseholdsinMENA arenow poorer'.
The Impacto fE MFTAso nGrowth
Ultimately,the behaviour ofmost ofthe variablesr eferred to so far (employment,income, stateexpenditureandlevels ofpoverty) isdetermined to ag reatextent byt he rateofg rowthofthe economy,so itisimportant to studyhow thiswill be affected bythe implementation ofEMFTAs. Firstly,it shouldbenoted thatthe mainpillars ofmany MPC economiesandhence the drivers ofg rowthtrendsandfl uctuations areoil,migrant remittancesand agriculture-andi ns omec asest ourism;anda ll ofthemaree xcluded or ignored inthe provisions ofEMFTAs. Sothe ups anddownsofgrowthrates will follow apattern determined mainlybydroughts,i nternationalo ilp rices andmigration,independently oftrade policy. Inany case, the enthusiasm for free trade asanenginefor growthseems to be largely overstated: the typical empiricalestimatesofthe impactofthe creation offree trade areasongrowth inless developed countriesrange from 2to3percent ofGDP overthe whole implementation period, thatis,a tbest,a nadditional0 .25percent pery ear overa12-yearp eriod. 25 Dueto the non-reciprocaln atureofE MFTAs discussed above(theywill not induce anincreaseofproduction to meetanonexistent increasei ndemandf or exports andwill not mobilizesubstantial amounts ofnewassistance resources),thisimpactwill necessarily be weaker inMPCs. Thisseems ratherlacklustreincomparison to the doublingofcurrent growthrates(to bringthemtoover5percent peryear) needed to absorbthe projected increaseint he labour force int hesec ountries.
Any possiblec ontribution ofE MFTAst os uch extraordinary growth performance isdependent on two keyconditions:(i)extendingittoall goods bygivingthe MPCs' agriculturalp roducts,c urrently excluded from the EMFTAs,access to Europeanmarkets; and(ii)asignificant build-up offoreign directinvestment (therebyopeningup newopportunitiesinmorecompetitive sectors to offsett he employment lossesinduced byt rade liberalization, compensatingfor the deterioration ofthe balance ofpayments andtriggeringa technologyspill-overwhich wouldfacilitateanincreaseinthe productivity of localindustryasawhole). Interestingly,f oreigndirectinvestment (FDI) attraction seems to haveb eeno neofthe mainr easons for MPCstoenterthe association agreements. However,eightyears afterthe BarcelonaConference, the impactofEMFTAsonFDI flows seems to havebeenlargely overestimated andcouldevenbe negative, withthe prospects for the windfall ofFDI predicted bysomeasbeingremote. 26 The lack ofhorizontalSouth-Southintegration is oftenmentioned to explainthisfailure, but the mainreasons undoubtedly lie in the negativeperceptions about security andstability inthisarea andinthe lack ofrelativec omparativea dvantage (not includinga griculture, excluded from trade liberalization altogether,a ndhydrocarbons). The EMFTAs,ast heyare currently defined, donot makeany positivecontributions to improvingthese conditions.
SocialandEconomic Conditions inMoroccoandthe ImpactofEMFTAs
AsshowninFigures3and4,Moroccoisoneofthe countriesmostvulnerableto free tradebothi nemployment andinbudgetary terms. Inaddition,i ts social problems aredauntingevenbyMPC standards,asshown bythe HumanPoverty Indexcalculated bythe United Nations Development Programme(UNDP)asa compositemeasureoffour indicators ofhumandeprivation (prematuredeath, illiteracy,lack ofaccess to basic servicesandmalnutrition) andits comparison withthe levels ofthe GDP percapita(see Figure5). Thiscomparison allowsus to grasp the (lack of)efficiencyo fe ach country int ransforminge conomic performance into betters ocialconditions for the poorest members ofthe population (countriesabovethe trendlinearebelow average efficiency).
FIGURE5 LEVELS OF HUMAN POVERTYV IS-À -VIS GDP PERCAPITAFOR EIGHT MPC S
Of course, itisfartoo early to drawany conclusions on how the free trade area withthe EU has affected the economic andsocialconditions ofi ts population inthiscountry. Indeed, the EMFTAhashardly covered athirdof its transitory period, andthe least damagingpart atthat(see note3). However, itisq uitepossibleto make someprojections based on the current dataa nd situation.
The schedulef or tariff dismantlingprovided for int he association agreement withMorocco(see Table1) providesfor the totalliberalization of capitalgoodsimports aso fthe entryintoeffecto fthe agreement (1 March 2000),stretchestariff dismantlingfor inputs,sparepartsandproducts thatare not producedlocally overt hree years (a25percent oftariff reduction every year,b eginninga tt he moment the agreement entered into effect) andd elays tariff dismantlingoflocally produced manufacturestothe period2003 -12 (10 percent oftariff reduction pery ear). Thus,d uringthe first three years ofthe agreement's implementation,the only effectofthe free trade area wouldhave beeno ns tatetariff revenueso nimported goodsandpricest hereof.From March 2003 the impactonlocalproduction andhence on employment should haveb egun to be felt morestrongly. 27 Accordingto Moroccangovernment estimates,the totall oss oftax revenuesfor Moroccoo vert his1 2-yearp eriodwill amount,takingastatic approach, to around1.9 percent ofG DP, 28 thatis,a naverage increaseof revenuelossesofcloseto 0.16 percent each year. 29 For 2003,the loss hasbeen estimated atm orethan e 225m,a namount thatfarexceedst he e 142m commitments inMEDA fundsm ade to thatcountry duringthe sameyear Source:A uthor's elaboration based on the EU-MoroccoAssociation Agreement.
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( e 426m areallocated for the 2002 -04period). Rough calculations show that each additionalyearoftariff dismantlinguntil2012 will causeanextra e 50m oftariff revenueloss for Morocco. 30 Inordertocompensatefor thisloss with anincreaseofV AT receipts,the latters houldg row atarateof2.9 percent each yearu pt o2 012 [Hamdaoui, 2002:22] .
The effects oftighteningpublic financeshavealreadybeenfelt since 1983 (the yearinwhich the first structuraladjustment programmewasapproved in Morocco).The numbero fpeoplelivingi nincomepoverty( defined ast he minimum incometo affordmeetingb asic needs) roseb yt wo-thirdsint he 1990s,a ccordingto officialfigures [EIU, 2001:26] , increasingf rom 13 per cent in1991 to 19 percent in1999(5.3 million people). Public foodsubsidies werecut from closeto 2percent to about 1percent ofGDP.Atthe sametime, instead ofup to 60,000 jobsbeingc reated every yearint he public sector between1 962 and1982,the last 20 years hass eent hisr educed to 11,000. 31 Infact,the Economic andSocialReformPlanapproved bythe government in 1999,a ftern egotiations withthe InternationalMonetary Fund(IMF) establishedthe targeto freducingthe wage mass ofthe public sector byt wo percentage points ofGDP by2003-04, soughttoachievethisby,amongother things,not replacingpublic servants astheyretired.Onthe otherhand, given thatstateemployees' wages,which areafixed expenditure, amount to nearly halfthe statebudget(43.4percent in2001,12.5percent ofGDP),thiscut in staterevenuewill arguably disproportionately affectthe otherstateexpenses, socialexpenditurea ndi nvestments.
Asfor the EU assistance fundsintendedto make up for theselossesand alleviatethe negativeconsequencesoffree trade, ofthe total e 1,180.5MEDA IandMEDAIIfundscommitted inMoroccoupuntil2003, e 656m for 1995-99 and e 524.5mfor 2000 -03 (which meant nevertheless triplingthe volume ofa ssistance inr egardto formerfinancialp rotocols),less thano ne-thirdh as beenactuallydisbursed so far. Moreover,ofthe approximately 25projects approved duringthisperiod, only afewhaveatruesocialdimension, 32 thatis, less than25percent ofthe fundscommitted aredirected to the socialsector. Similarly,ofthe fiveprioritiesidentified int he 2002 -04N ationalIndicative Programme(institutionals upport,i np articularfor the reform ofpublic administration,trade facilitation,humanresource development,migration and environmentalp rotection),noneh asad irects ocialdimension ass uch (although the supportfor the development ofthe northern provincesis mentioned asawayo fcontainingi mmigration).
Asfarasp opulation incomei sconcerned, accordingto econometric estimatesm adebyCurrie andHarrison [1997] , inthe 1980s andearly 1990s every reduction intariffsby10percentage points led to adeclineinwagesof state-owned enterpriseso fa lmost 3p ercent.Thesea uthors foundthat,i n Morocco,employment levels inthe average privatesectormanufacturingfirm wereb asically not affected byt rade liberalization duringthatp eriod, but the context thenw asv ery different.The implementation ofthe 1976 Trade and Cooperation Agreement withthe EuropeanEconomic Community meant openingup Europeanindustrialm arkets to Moroccanm anufactured goods (mainlyt extiles),thus presentingnewo pportunitiest oo ffsett he negative impacto ftariff reductions. Actually,C urrie andH arrison noted significant employment lossesinspecific groups offirms,which started to rely moreon less well-paid, temporary workers (resultinginariseofnearly 20 percentage points inthe shareoftemporary employment inmanufacturingbetween1984 and1990).
Although itisv ery difficult to estimatei nconcreteterms the impacto f industrialtrade liberalization on localproduction,the loss ofemployment will be compounded byt he factt hatt he implementation ofthe first stageso fthe EU-Moroccofree trade area coincidesw iththe loss ofpreferentialaccess to Europeantextilemarkets,beginningon 1January 2005(since 1976,Morocco andall the otherMPCshaveenjoyed unlimited access to Europeanindustrial markets free oftariffs,whereascompetingtextileproducers,particularly SouthEast Asiancountries,h aveb eens ubjectt os trictq uotasu ndert he Multifibre Agreement). Thist hreatt oits export markets isp articularly important as textilesandc lothingmakeup morethan2 5percent oftotalexports from Morocco, 33 thatis,$2.4bnayear,94percent ofthemtoEU markets,andthe textilei ndustry employs 190,000 (direct) workers,6p ercent oftotal employment. Employment int hisindustryhasalreadys uffered asevere adjustment since 1999 (withaloss of29,600 jobs),d uemainly to the real exchange rateappreciation ofthe dirham. Itnow risksbeinghitstill harderby the liberalization ofaccess to the Europeanmarketin2005bothfor all World Trade Organization (WTO)m embercountries( includingC hina)andf or the newEU memberstatesofEastern Europe, which offerasimilarlevelofwages andthe samegeographicalproximity asthe MPCs. The threattothisindustry in MPCS iscompounded byl ow levels ofproductivity (although thiss ector employs 6percent ofthe occupiedpopulation,its contribution to GDP isonly 3 percent). 34 The genderdimension ofthisthreattoanindustry where70 percent ofthe employeesarewomencanhardly be overstated.
Sofar,however,officialunemployment statisticsdonot show asignificant worseningofthe employment situation inMorocco. Ont he contrary, accordingto the government the urbanu nemployment rateh ascomed own steadily,from 22 percent in1999 to 18.2 percent in2002,reducingthe total numbero funemployed from1 ,433,000 to 1,196,000. However,this improvement must be qualified byt he reduction int he activity rate (the percentage ofworking-age population int he labour force)from 54.4 percent to 51.3p ercent,which means thatt he totaln umbero fe mployed peoplehasactually fallen(morethan70percent ofthe unemployed havebeen int hiss ituation for morethanayear,a nda roundh alfthe unemployed have neverhad ajob). However,the statisticsregistered anapparent trendchange in 2003,when,inspiteofthe favourableweatherconditions for agricultureand the consequently excellent growthperformance,unemployment increased slightly to 1,283,000persons (19.3 percent inthe urbanareas),inpart alsodue to anincreaseofthe activity rateto 52percent. Inany case, thissmall change seems determined morebydemographic dynamics(growthofthe labour force atratesofover4percent andincreasingactivity rateofwomen,currently at 33 percent) thanbyany impacto ftariffdismantling.
Att he legislativelevel,the far-reachingmodernization project,ofwhich the Euro-MediterraneanPartnershipisapart,progressesatasteadypace asa complement to trade liberalization.Two recent major steps int hisdirection takenduring2003 arethe newLabour Code andImmigration Law,the latter severely criticized bylawyers andhumanrights associations for internalizing the restrictivesecurity approach to immigration typicalo fE uropean legislation.Asfor the newLabour Code publishedi nDecember2 003, 35 itis seenasac ornerstoneofthe Moroccangovernment's generaleconomic strategyt oattractforeigndirectinvestment (ofwhich trade liberalization is anotherelement),strengthenits privatesector competitiveness anda dapt its legalframeworkto the free trade challenge.The newLabour Code is indisputably amajor contribution to the modernization ofindustrialrelations inMorocco,i ntroducingmodern institutionss uch asw orkscouncils and implementingthe coreInternationalLabour Organization (ILO)conventions, reducingweekly workingh ours from 48 to 44 hours,i ncreasingthe minimum workingage to 15(previously12),andfacilitatingthe creation and functioningofnewt rade unions.
However,a tt he sametimei tdoesentails omerestrictionso nw orkers' socialr ights withoutt he parallelcreation ofagenuinesocials afety net providingaminimuml evelo fb enefits,particularly int he event of unemployment (thereisstill no unemployment insurance systeminMorocco). The righttostrike islimited, dueto the imposition ofamandatory conciliation procedureb eforec allingastrike andb yincluding'violations off reedom to work'amongthe 'seriousfaults' thatcanentailaworkerbeinglaid off without severance payment [ ActualitésSociales ,2003] .Anewemphasisisp ut on employment flexibility aso neofthe cornerstoneso fthe newl egislation;in concreteterms,thist ranslates,f or instance, into suppressingthe automatic grantingoffi xed workers tatus after1 2m onthso fc ontinuous worki nt he industry andtrade sectors andextendingthe possibleuseoftemporary jobstemporary labour contracts mayl ast for sixm onthsandc anbe prolonged twice, thatis,for atotalduration of18months,andeventwo years incertain cases. Thisalso involvesthe subsequent limitingofsocialrights,byextending the probation periodf or neww orkers,makingi tp ossiblef or employers to reduce the workingperiodto 75d ays pery earanda llowinge mployers to reduce wages. Inaddition,thereisnolegalprovision for the indexingofwages to price increases,thus openingthe door for arecurrent deterioration inr eal wages. 36 Asafinalconsideration,ifitistruethatthe proliferation ofshanty towns aroundthe big cities( 25percent ofthe urbanp opulation,a round4million people, arecalculated to be livinginprecarious,non-regulated andunhealthy habitation,e speciallyinCasablanca)iso neof'the most shocking manifestations ofthe socialdeficit' 37 inMorocco,a ndthatt herei sad irect linkbetweenthisincreasingmisery (in1993 the samefigurewasonly 14per cent) andthe progress ofIslamic politicalfundamentalism,the politicalstakes arequiteobvious. Thisphenomenon goeshandinhandwithruralmigration. InMorocco,44percent ofthe population (morethan13million people)livein the countryside, wherethe incidence ofincomepovertyisalmost doublethat ofthe urbanareas. TheE MP, asitisbeingc urrently implemented,d oesn ot assist inkeepingthisr uralp opulation awayfrom the cities( ito ffers no new exporto pportunitiesfor theirp roducts),b ut neitherdoesito fferbetter employment opportunitiesinthe cities. Rather,the implementation ofthe free trade area couldpushsomeofthe current industrialemployeesinto unemployment andpoverty.
How to Mitigatethe SocialCosts ofT rade Liberalization,or Promote aS ocialandE conomic Rights EnhancingE MP
From the above, itisquiteclearthatthe creation ofEuro-Mediterraneanfree trade areasalone, withoutaseto fc omplementary accompanyingmeasures contributingto af ully-fledged strategyfor meetingthe socialande conomic challengesfaced byt he MPCsande asingtransition to amoremodern and liberalized economy,will haveasubstantially negativei mpacto nt he population's socialande conomic conditions andrights.
Of course, the most effectivelong-term wayt om inimizethiss ocialcost (andmaximizethe potentialbenefits oftradeliberalization)liesoutsidethe field ofsocialp olicyitself: investment inab etterandmoree venlydistributed education system,e nsuringageneralincreasei np roductivity. 38 However,the negativeimpactoftradeliberalization will be felt immediately.Peoplecannot be educated overnight,norcant heyw aitfor the positivee ffects ofthe new liberalized environment to improvetheirlot in10or20years'time.Hence,an immediatepolicyresponseisneeded.Since alternativestofree tradeareno longer arealoption (ithasproved,asChurchill famously saidaboutdemocracy,to be the worstformo fall internationalt raderegimesexcept for all the others),the room for manoeuvrei no rientatingi tm orepositively liesinsteadi nt he time frameworkf or its implementation (thatis,the paceoftradeliberalization), 39 the sequencingofliberalization 40 andthe adoption ofaccompanyingmeasures andregionalinitiativeso ffsettingthe negativec onsequenceso ff ree tradea nd leadingto anoptimaloutcome.
APartnershipfor GeneratingJ obsandIncome
No'Partnership' canworkifitisnot balanced.Sofor the EMFTAstoachieve theirs tated goals ofpromotingd evelopment,i nsteadofe ndingup being considered asm erely anotherhistoricalattempt byEuropeancountriest o imposetheireconomic interests upon Mediterraneancountriesint he postcolonials etting, the maint est isw hethert he EMP asawholeproducesan equitableresult,b othvertically (regardingthe distribution ofb enefits and costs amongthe Europeancountriesandthe MPCs) andh orizontally (regardingthe distribution ofb enefits andc osts betweendifferent social groups withineach MPC).
Inthe frameworkofthe EMP itself, the measuresandactions to 'mitigate the negativesocialconsequencesw hich mayr esult' from the EMFTAs-i n the wordso fthe BarcelonaD eclaration -shouldb ea nintegralp art ofthe package.Without them,the creation off ree trade areasalonec ouldh ave destabilizingc onsequences:theyw ouldb eh ardly sustainable, eitherin macroeconomic or politicalterms,andwouldfailtopromotethe truegoalof the Partnershipo f'sustainablea ndb alanced economic andsocial development'. Thus itisn ot possibleto dissociatethe different components ofthe Euro-MediterraneanPartnershipandlimitits implementation,i n practice, to the EMFTAs.
Although ithasbeens tated that' the assessment ofqualitativee ffects associated withthe creation ofaFree Trade Zonecannot be dissociated from the [national]macro-economic policiesw hich accompany the elimination of customs tariffs' [Zaafranea ndM ahjoub, 2000:18] , itisalso truethatt he impacto fthe EMFTAso neconomic andsocialconditions will dependto a large extent on the accompanyingmeasurest akenatt he levelo fthe EMP. Someobvious lineso fa ction int hisdirection areoriented to generatej obs andi ncome, the best recipef or encouragingatrued evelopment process in the MPCs. The BarcelonaD eclaration itselfstated that' the creation ofafree-trade area andthe success ofthe Euro-MediterraneanPartnershipr equiresa substantialincreasei nfinancialassistance't ot he MPCs. Todatethe allocated fundshaveb eenclearly insufficient,i mplyingapredictable failure.In2 002,d isbursementsattained arecordof0.25percent ofthe MPCs' GDP,which isindeed 'alarge amount byinternationalstandards' [EIB, 2002:2] , but byall accounts insufficient,e vent oalleviate the negativec onsequenceso ftrade liberalization,letaloneto meet the enormous socialn eedso fM PCs. Infact,the overall financial implications ofthe EMP for MPCsareclearly negative, asthe loss oftariff revenuesbyt he statef arexceedst he assistance received from MEDA funds. Asfor the orientation ofthesef unds,the stated mainp rioritieso f MEDA II areto assist MPCst oimplement free tradewiththe EU andto achievesustainablee conomic growththrough macroeconomic and structuralr eforms,togetherw ithsomei mprovement ofthe social conditions ofthe population. Indeed, about 45 percent ofthesef unds wereactually allocated to projects supportingeconomic transition,private sector development andstructuraladjustment,witharesultingvery weak, if not overtly negative, impacto nsocialconditions.
Asfarasthe socialdimension offinancialco-operation isconcerned, all the 2002-04N ationalIndicativeP rogrammes( NIPs) mention social development asak eydimension ofc o-operation. However,therei sa strongb iasint he wayt heyapproach thisissue, asfrequently NIPsl imit themselvest os ocials ectors linked to the economy,such asv ocational training, thatis,theyaredrivenbythe mise-à-niveau logic offocusingon the competitiveness oflocalfirmsinstead ofon the socialneedsofpeople, which seemt obe subsidiary throughout the wholeB arcelonaprocess. Totalallocations for the socials ector amountt o e 1.35bn( therea re24 projects planned inthisfield, andanother31alreadybeingexecuted across the 12 MPCs),j ust over2 5percent ofthe totalv olumeoff undsm ade availableb yt he EU.
Returningto the totalamount offundscommitted bythe EU withinthe frameworkofthe EMP, areasonableminimum threshold-which would also make economic sense-wouldb eto ensureaflow ofc o-operation resourcesatleast sufficient to compensatefor the loss ofcustomsrevenue ast he tariffsdismantlingprogrammeproceeds. Ac omplementary and moregenerous andeffectivemechanism couldbeaform of'guarantee of netp ositivef unding',makingsurethatt he totals um ofe conomic flows betweenevery MPCandthe EU (nettrade balance, FDI flows,aid flows, netp rivatea ndpublic funding, whetherm igrants' remittancesaretaken into account or not) ispositiveinevery country andfor every year. 41 This wouldg ivea nincentiveto Europeangovernments to restructuretheir outstandingc redits to the MPCsandthus contributeto reducingtheir foreigndebtburden.
. Int hiscontext,f oreigndebtr elief isarequirement for freeingresources for development inMPCsandi ncreasingthe state's financialcapability. The estimated externaldebtvolumeofMPCsin2001 amounted to $160bn, withayearly debts ervice ofup to $19bnt haty ear. The factist hat servicingthe foreigndebtincurred bythosestatesinthe past (not always subjecttothe most elementary precautionary bankingpracticesonthe part SOCIAL IMPACT OF EURO-MED FREETRADE AREAS ofthe creditors) andmakingg oodthe socialdeficito ftheirp opulation (whichc analso be seenasah istoricaldebtinm any respects) cannot be achieved simultaneouslyoverthe next 20 years.Soachoiceisnecessary, asm uch for the MPCst hemselvesasfor theircreditors,to alarge extent Europeancountries( debtt oEuropeanstatesaverages65percent oftotal externalMPC debt).Onepossibleschemeto reduce thisdebts ervice burden,withoutdisruptingfinancialmarkets,wouldbeto promotedebtfor socialinvestment swaps atadiscount,alongthe linesofwhathasalready beendonewithd ebtfor privatei nvestment swaps,b ut the current rules regulatingthe management ofinternationaldebt(withinthe frameworkof the ParisClubofsovereigncreditors) severely limits the extent ofsuch initiatives.
. However,beyondaid anddebt,the openingup ofEUagriculturalmarkets to the products comingfrom the MPCsisprobably the only realstepthatcould (re)establishthe balance ofrights andobligations inthe EMP betweenboth groups ofcountries. For severalMPCs,agricultureisoneofthe very few sectors wheretheyhaveatruecomparativeadvantage andwheretheycould increasee xports to the EU significantly overt he short term (thereby offsettingto somee xtent the predictabled eterioration oftheirbalance of paymentsasac onsequence ofthe implementation ofE MFTAs). In addition,agricultureinthesecountriesisalabour-intensiveindustry,so its development couldmake animportant contribution to absorbingthe increaseinthe labour force, which thosecountriesaregoingto face overthe next 20 years.Agriculturetypically involvesbetween10and20 percent of GDP inthe MPCsandmorethan20percent ofjobs; ithasadirectimpacton the welfareofaround40percent ofthe population.
Instead ofthe (quiteprudent) formulaa dopted int he Barcelona Declaration for manufacturing-'tariff andnon-tariff barriers to tradei n manufactured products will be progressively eliminated inaccordance with timetablest obe negotiated betweent he partners'-i nt he caseof agriculturalproducts the emphasiswasnot put on liberalization,but on the caveats: takinga sastartingpoint traditionalt rade flows,a nd asfarast he various agriculturalpoliciesallow andwithd uerespectfor the results achieved withinthe GATT negotiations, 42 trade inagriculturalproducts will be progressively liberalised through reciprocalp referentialaccess amongthe parties. [emphasisadded] Apart from the factthatthislock-inof'traditionaltrade flows' isused only asawayo flimitingthe exports from MPCs,a ndi sn ot extended to other sectors wherei tcouldb enefitt hem( for instance,to introduce ac ertain guarantee scheme, maybe gradual,to lock int he current textileexports from the MPCs,threatened bythe elimination ofthe MultifibreAgreement in2005, discussed above),thisgraduall iberalization ofa griculturalexchanges provided for int he association agreements hasy ett ot ranslatei nto real progress (negotiations weresupposed to begino vert hisin2 000).
The most recent agreement reached withM oroccoinDecember2 003, 43 afterm orethant hree-and-a-halfyears ofnegotiations,d oesp roceed int he rightdirection,b ut not atanencouragingpace.Moreover,a ndmost importantly,i tdoesn ot change the model ofa griculturalt rade relations betweent he EU andthe MPCs,b ased on quantitativelimitations andtaking historicalt rade flows asareference int he 1988 additionalp rotocol to the EU-MoroccoTrade andCooperation Agreement (adopted int he wakeofthe SpanishE Ua ccession); the 'traditional' import volumeso fthe years immediately prior to the agreement werelocked inatfixed quotas,a nd15 years afterwardst he only progress liesinanincreaseofthosequotast oa limited extent overthe next four years 44 inexchange for areciprocalopening ofM oroccanagriculturemarkets (particularly for softw heat,ofwhich Moroccoisab ig importerandU Sproduction isastrongc ompetitor for EuropeanCommunity (EC)andparticularly French production). The tenetof free trade seems to be ignored evenasag oal( no schedulef or totalfinal liberalization hasevenbeendiscussed, howeverl ongthe transitory period mighthaveb een) int hiss ector. Actually,undert he current conditions the MPCsasawholeh aveadeficitint heiragriculturalt radeb alance with the EU. 45 Interestingly,evenoutrightunilateralliberalization ofagriculturetrade by the EU vis-à-vist he MPCso verafi ve-yeart erm wouldnot haveadramatic impacto nits own agriculturalm arkets. Dueto structuralconstraints int he agriculturals ector inMPCs,such asw aters carcity andtechnological backwardness,the increasei nt heiragriculturalexports to the EU would amountto11percent ofthe current intra-community agriculturalexchanges. Thisisavery modest impactindeed (although for someproducts,like edible fruits,the increasewill be substantially higher,a ndthe costs ofthisn ew competition appears highly concentrated inMediterraneanEU member states),a lthough for the MPCsitw ouldmeananimportant boost to their agriculturalexports (for instance,a27 percent increase, 1.4percent ofi ts GDP, for Morocco,and23 percent for Egypt,3.26percent ofits GDP). 46 In employment terms,the samestudyestimatesthatthisunilateralliberalization wouldentailthe creation of115,000 newdirectjobsinthe agriculturalsector inMorocco,23,000 inEgypt and66,000 inTunisia.
. If the MPCsandthe EU areserious about the stated goalo fa chievinga sustainableandbalanced economic andsocialdevelopment,itdoesmake full senseto integratequantifiede mployment targets ande mployment SOCIAL IMPACT OF EURO-MED FREETRADE AREAS impactassessment atall levels ofthe EMP, includingM EDAf undsand EMFTAs,becausethereishardly any moreimportant socialandeconomic challenge int heirn earfuturethant he challenge to offeremployment opportunitiestothe MPCs' rapidly increasingpopulations. Furthermore, in general,e xplicits ocialp olicyt argets int erms ofa ctivity rate, poverty incidence, education indicatorsandsocialsecurity coverage, togetherwith regularevaluation andmonitoring(accordingto the principleof co-responsibility),need to be incorporated asapermanent featureofthe Barcelonaprocess,ashasalreadybeendonewithinthe EU inthe framework ofthe socialandemployment policysurveillance process (see Appendix). If undertakenatt he regionall evel,this' scoreboarda pproach'could createb othafairbenchmarkingf rameworka ndastrongi ncentivef or progress int hosea reast hrough comparativea nalysisandplacingb oth politicalp ressureon laggardsasw ell aso fferingfi nancialincentivest o leaders.
. Last,b ut notl east,the very concept of'Partnership' andthe goals ofthe EuropeanCommunity development co-operation policys tated inArticle 177 ofthe AmsterdamTreaty (to fosters ustainablee conomic andsocial development,to promotethe smootha ndg radualintegration ofthe development countriesinto the worldeconomy,to fightpoverty,to make a contribution to the generalo bjectiveofd evelopinga ndc onsolidating democracyandthe ruleoflaw,andto respecthumanrights andfundamental freedoms) requiresanextension ofthe narrow definition ofh umanr ights contained int he association agreements to include economic andsocial rights.Itisamoralparadox that,whilethe EU takessteps to safeguardand consolidateits own socialmodel,itignoresitcompletely inits relations with its 'partners'. Inthisview,aminimalbasiso fsocialandeconomic rights shouldbecomeanintegralpart ofco-operation withMPCs-a nessential element ofthe Partnership,asstated inrespectofhumanrights -alongwith ajoint SocialAction Plandesigned to achieveasquickly aspossiblethisset ofbaselinerights on the basisofjoint responsibility. 47 
NationalPolicies
Aso bserved above, therei sn odoubtt hatasoundmacroeconomic environment isanecessary condition for humandevelopment. Yetits importance asasteppingstonefor growthanddevelopment hasbeenlargely overstated int he last 20 years,a ndi nany casemost ofthe MPCss how a remarkableperformance inthisarea interms ofinflation control,reduction of public deficitandeven,insomecases,consolidation ofbalance ofpayments.
Itiso ftent he casethatl ess developed countries' governments try to explain 48 the failureto enhance socialandeconomic rights andconditionsin terms ofe xogenous factors 49 not subjectt ointernalp olicyintervention.
However,someofthesefactorsareactually endogenous (such asforeigndebt itselfor trade liberalization),andevenwhenthe causes ofmisfortunearedue to naturalforces( asint he caseofd roughts) the statestandsr esponsiblea nd hasaroleto playinm itigatinga ndoffsettingthe negative consequences of thesefactors on economic andsocialconditions. Yet,how canitdothisinthe concretecaseoftariff dismantlingthrough the creation ofE MFTAs? Nol ess important thanm acroeconomic stability ist he creation ofa n 'enablingsocialenvironment' thato ffers every citizent he possibility of findingh iso rhereconomic place ins ociety andh avinga nautonomous and full life.The creation oftheseconditions isavery complexandlongprocess, but therei sl ittled oubtt hatt he promotion ofuniversall iteracyandthe improvement ande xtension ofe ducation to all (primary andsecondary,b ut also vocationalt raininga nda dulteducation) isatop priority. 50 Education is itselfoneofthe coresocialr ights,a ndi nt he samemannerast he rightt oan adequatelivingstandard, isaprecondition for full enjoyment ofe conomic rights (inaddition,i tm ust not be forgottent hatt he education systemisan important source ofemployment itself),but atthe sametimeitcanbe argued thatitalso acts asag enerator ofc ivilandpoliticalr ights for the citizens. Son ationalp oliciess houldput maximum emphasiso nincreasinge ducation expenditurea ndon the quality ofthe education system,whilst closely monitoringenrolment rates,literacyratesandotherindicatorsofeducational attainment.
Inthe socialfielditself, thereisevidence thatthe numberofILO conventions ratified hasastronga ndpositivec orrelation witha ll indicators ofi ncome distribution equality [Rama, 2001:31] .Thisismainlydueto the factthatthis numberisitselfstrongly correlated withthe shareofthe GDPdevoted to social security,so the latterratherthanthe formershouldbethe targetvariable.
Aless structural,b ut very important policym easurei sintervention in labour markets to easethe adjustment costsfor specificsocialgroups or regions. Even-or particularly -industrialcountriesthathaveopened up their economies( for instance,SpainandPortugalint he secondhalfofthe 1980s) haveaccompanied the restructuringofdecliningindustrieswithcompensation anda ssistance to thosea tr iskoflosingtheirjobs( thus defusingsocial resistance to economic transition). Although theseprogrammescanbe criticized int erms ofe quity (theyt endto benefitw orkers,whoarea lready betteroff thanmost ofthe population),the alternativeto compensation canbe simply alack ofrestructuringd ueto trade union resistance.Designingthese programmescanbe difficult,but the actualriskinthe Mediterraneancountries ist ocompletely neglectt hemgivent hatt he adjustment isgoingto affect privatea ndmostly small andmiddle-sized enterprises( whoseworkers have less mobilization powerthanthe employeesofbig statecompaniesprivatized or restructured int he 1990s).
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Anotherp roposed measurei st he creation or enhancement ofunemployment insurance schemes. However,availableresourcesmightmorerationally be redirected to jobcreation schemes(for example, public worksprogrammes offeringwagelevels below the average labour earningso funskilled workers to ensurethattheydonot competewiththe privatesectorfor workers),which wouldb emorec oherent bothi nequity ande fficiencyt erms.Asa distinguished internationalgroup ofscholars andpolicym akers hasr ecently concluded:'itwouldmakesensefor countriestoadopt employment targets as part ofthe budgetary process,a ndto make employment impactanalysisan explicitcriterion ofmacroeconomic policydecision-making' [ILO, 2004: 64] ino rdert oenhance asm uch asp ossiblethe labourintensity ofgrowth.
Indeed, public workprogrammes-aclassicalKeynesianp olicyt hathas shown its efficiencyagainanda gain-a ndthe promotion ofrural development seemt obe the two singlepoliciest hatcouldrespondto all the socialande conomic challengeso fthe MPCss imultaneously. Public works programmescanbe managed so astooffsetthe negativeimpactofeconomic downturns on poverty (for instance,b ad crops) or oftrade liberalization in particulars ectors or regions,to providethe basic socialinfrastructuresfor small communities( especially housing, waterdistribution andsewerage systems),e mpoweringthemt hrough betteraccess to basic services,a ndto buildthe infrastructuresn eeded to increasenationalcompetitiveness and attractm oreF DI (notably transportandtelecommunications infrastructures). Theyarelabourintensiveandthe shareofwagesintheirtotalcosts amounts to about 60 percent inTunisia and50percent inMorocco(inthe latter,amuch largers hareofresourcess eems to be spent on administrativee xpenses), creatinga neffectivei ncometransferm echanism to the poor. 52 Moreimportantly,thesekindsofindirectandnon-permanent mechanisms aremuch morec ost-effectivea ndd on ot createthe distortions inherent in other,moredirect,instruments ofstateredistribution policy,such assubsidies -to foodprices,for instance -a ndtransferschemesorthe outrightexpansion ofstatepayrolls,which reinforce the rentiernatureofthe economic systemin MPCs. Ruraldevelopment programmes,i nt urn,reduce the dependencyo f foodi mports (andthe need for foreigncurrency),c ontributeto retainingthe ruralp opulation int he countryside, anda readirectm eans offi ghting widespreadruralp overty.
Conclusion
Arecent extensivereviewofresearch on the adjustment process inrespectof trade liberalization sponsored bythe WorldTrade Organization concludesthat 'asurveyo fe mpiricalestimateso fa djustment costsr eveals substantial difficultiesindefiningthe truenatureofa djustment costs andi nm easuring thosecosts. Results from all studiesknown to the authors,however,show that adjustment costs aresmall compared to the benefits oftrade' [Bacchetta andJansen,2003:6] . 53 Thesamepattern liesbehinda1999 studycarriedout bythe IMF on the socialandemployment costs andbenefits ofprivatization, represented ina'U-curve'r esemblingthe onei nFigure6 [Gupta etal., 1999:6] .However,the problemist hat,a st he IMF paperexplicitly acknowledged, thesec ostsu sually manifest themselvesimmediately after trade liberalization -or privatization -occurs,a ndtheyarec oncentrated in certains ocialgroups ande vens ometimesins pecific geographicalareas, whereasthe benefits tendto take amuch longertimeto emerge andarespread thinly across the economy.
The IMF paperargued thatjoblossescaused byp rivatization were concentrated int he pre-privatization stage andthe timei mmediately after privatization,but afteraperiodoftimetherewasarecovery which led to the set-off ofjoblossesandevenled to anetcreation ofjobs. Itmade acasefor the establishment ofsocialsafety nets to cushion the negativeshort-term effects of privatization duringthe periodi nw hich the negativee ffects surpass the positiveeffects (asindicated inFigure6). Whatthe IMF paperdid not address isw hatw ouldh appenif thiss afety netw erenot implemented parallelt o FIGURE6 TIME DISTRIBUTION OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC COSTSOFECONOMIC REFORM SOCIAL IMPACT OF EURO-MED FREETRADE AREAS the economic reforms (be itp rivatization or externalt rade liberalization). Additionally,i tdid not considereithert he possibility ofthe existence ofa 'socials ustainability threshold'-the absolutelimito fnegativee ffects of policiesande conomic reformw ithouts ufficient compensatingmeasuresa socialgroup or awholepopulation maysufferbeforerevoltinginonewayor another. Beyondthist hreshold, ac ountry enters aturbulence area ofsocial disturbance,e conomic breakdownandoverall instability wheree conomic laws don ot holda ny more(preventinga nticipated futurepositivee ffects of reform from materializing)andthe institutionalcapabilitiesr equired for guaranteeingcivilandpoliticalrights wouldnot workany more, givingwayin extremecasestothe phenomenon of'failed states'.Thereisagoodcasethat, inthe current demographic, socialandeconomic environment inmany MPCs, the implementation off ree trade areasw ithout the proposed countervailing andaccompanyingmeasurescouldcross thissocialsustainability lineandend up beingdestabilizinganddetrimentaltothe development prospects ofthose countries,a sFigure6illustrates.
Ont he otherhand, the long-term benefits off ree trade seemt obe highly dependent on eithermultiplyingthe current flows offoreigndirectinvestment byaf actor oftwo or three, anexpansion ofe xportv olumeso rasubstantial increaseoffi nancialassistance flows from Europeanp artners.Int he current setting, the designandi mplementation ofthe EMP -i ts lack ofreal reciprocity -d oesnot providetheseflows. Moreover,evenif benefits would farexceed the costs oftariffd ismantlingovert he longterm (thatis,i fthe temporary worseningofeconomic conditionsinthe country wouldbeaform ofinvestment infuturedevelopment),akeypoliticalandeconomic question is how to manage thosec osts overt he transition periodto make the whole process oftrade liberalization ande conomic transition sustainablei n macroeconomic andpoliticalt erms. Trade liberalization maybe anecessary condition,b ut itisclearly not asufficient onef or economic andsocial development inthe MPCs,andinmany MPCs(andbeyond)itseems to have becomeasubstitutef or arealdevelopment strategy( withthe side-effecto f removingthe choice ofadevelopment strategyfrom the public debate).
Toworkproperly,the Barcelonaschemeneedstobe complemented inone wayo ranotherbyaminimum guaranteedstandardofsocialande conomic rights (thatis,aneffectivesocialsafety net). Thismaybe the only waytosolve the timingproblemm entioned above(andthisisn ot merely atheoretical statement:itisthe mainlesson thatcanbe drawn from anumberofsuccessful trade liberalization cases,such asSpainandPortugalinthe late1980s,where liberalization wasaccompanied byt he implementation ofawelfarestate system). Thesesafety nets shouldb enefitn ot only thosec urrently employed (for instance,through unemployment benefits),b ut also the population asa whole.
Indeed, since 'people[ also inMPCs]a remost directly affected by globalization [andtrade liberalization]through theirw orka nde mployment' and'thatishow peopleexperience the opportunitiesandadvantages,aswell ast he risksande xclusions' [ILO,2004: 64] , if no action ist akent o complement free trade withproactivepoliciesandmeasurest oo ffsetits negativec onsequences,therei sariskofabacklashnot only against globalization andthe EuropeanUnion andthe West atlarge, but against even capitalism andthe marketeconomy themselves.
APPENDIX TOWARDSAMEDITERRANEAN SYSTEM OF REGIONALS URVEILLANCE OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMICR IGHTS?
The EU hasextensivee xperience int he multilaterals urveillance ofsocialande mployment policiesunderthe 'SocialPolicyAgenda'andthe 'EuropeanEmployment Strategy'. However,it hasput ittoworkexclusively amongits memberstates,not inits relationswith'thirdcountries', howevercloseapartnershipithasw iththem. The interest ofE Usurveillance methodologiesdeveloped overtimeon atrialanderror basis-liesprecisely inthe factthatinthesematters the EU institutions haveno competence oftheirown,so theyhaveto workon the basisofvoluntary commitments,peerp ressurea ndpoliticalincentives,rathert hanbyw ayo flegalcoercion anda waivertosovereignty bynationalauthorities. Tothisextent the legalsituation iscomparableto the oneprevailingbetweenthe EU andthe MPCsu nderthe association agreements.
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The process ofsocialp olicys urveillance withint he EU workso nt he basiso famonitoring process ofanumberofselected indicatorsagainst the doublebenchmarkofthe regionalaverage andasetofexplicit,quantitativegoals agreed upon amongst the members/partners to be achieved withins pecific timef rameworks. Thisallows the construction ofascoreboardreflectingthe performance ofe very country takingpart int he exercisea ndthe regularp ublication ofprogress reports andrecommendations /guidelinesw ithout legally bindinge ffects,b ut withastrong politicalandmedia impact.
Inthe introduction to the 2003 'Scoreboardon Implementingthe SocialPolicyAgenda'ofthe EU, 55 the goalofthe scoreboardisdescribedas'to keeptrack ofthe achievementsandto verifythe commitment andc ontributions from the different actors' and'not to provide any rankingof MemberState's performance,b ut rathert om onitor how the agenda ist ransformed into policy measuresandconcreteactions '. Inthe scoreboardfor 2004 56 the mainobjectiveofthe agenda is defined as' establishingadynamic andmutually reinforcingi nteraction betweeneconomic, employment andsocialpolicy'; thisobjectivecouldhardly be morerelevant inthe frameworkof the EMP andthe economic policyofthe MPCsatl arge.
Onamoreadvancedlevel(or atalaterstage),on the basisofthisscoreboarditispossibleevento agree on nationalorregionalaction plans on economic andsocialrights.Of course, since the whole reviewprocess isaknowledge-intensiveandinformation-sharingactivity wheregooddataiscritical, aswell asapoliticallysensitiveexercise, the roleinthisprocess ofarelatively independent,'technical' bodysuch asthe EuropeanCommission isakeytoits success.Although such aninstitution hasyetto be created inthe frameworkofthe EMP, the research institutenetworksForum Euro-Méditerranéen desInstituts É conomiques(FEMISE)andEuro-MediterraneanStudyCommission (EuroMesco) could playanimportant roleinthe initialstages. But evenif officialEuro-Mediterraneaninstitutionsdonot takeup thist ask, therei sastrongc asef or regionaln on-governmentalo rganizations( NGOs) or networkstotakeup the challenge andinitiatesuch anexerciseon theirown,asithasbeendoneinthe past for civilandpoliticalrights monitoringandreporting.
Thisr esults-oriented policyr eviewp rocess also lendsitselfto ad ifferentiated approach by country,takingi nto account the countries' different initiall evels or various degreeso f SOCIAL IMPACT OF EURO-MED FREETRADE AREAS commitment. Goals canbe defined not inabsoluteterms (thatis,'to achieveanunemployment rate of10 percent withanactivity rateof60 percent'),but inrelativeterms (namely,'to reduce the unemployment rateby10percent andincreasethe activity rateby5percentage points') to take account ofthesed ifferences. The startingpoint ofe very country coulda lso be used to establish 'minimumt hresholds' ofc ertaineconomic andsocialr ights,triggering, wheneveraserious setback isdetected inoneparticularindicator,the adoption ofjoint safeguardmeasuresinthe form ofeitheratemporary suspension/adjournment ofthe identified causes(whentheylie inapolicy measure, such ast rade liberalization), 57 or the implementation ofa nautomatic compensatory measuresuch asanincreaseand/or reorientation ofMEDA fundstofocus on the improvement of thisparticularindicator. Inany case, inorderfor the systemtoworkitisvery important to standby the principleofjoint responsibility ofall the partners for the individualperformance ofevery one ofthem.
Also,surveillance ofe mployment andsocialp olicyp erformance couldb ei ntegrated into a moregeneralsurveillance process monitoringthe economic andsocialpolicyasawhole(ashas happened withint he EU, where, since 2003,the annualGuidelinesandR ecommendations on MemberStates' Employment Policieshaveb eensubsumed into the broad exerciseofthe Broad Economic PolicyGuidelines).
Asfor the concretevariablestobe tracked int he frameworkofthissurveillance exercisein ordertoguarantee thatfree trade doesnot lead to adeterioration ofeconomic andsocialrights in the MPCs,the 'scoreboard'ofindicatorss houldatleast include measuresof:
. humandevelopment compositeindex(UNDP);
. genderandminoritiesequality indicators;
. employment andactivity rates(righttow ork);
. education enrolment ratesandeducation expenditure;
. healthexpenditures,access to healthcareservicesdataa ndhealthindicators;
. expenditureinsocialsecurity andsocialinfrastructures(water,housing);
. poverty measures(includingdataon access to housingandsocialinfrastructuresandincome distribution).
However,someform ofqualitativeanalysisshouldcomplement theseeasily availablequantitative indicatorsinordertoguarantee theireffectiveness inahumanrights framework. NOTES 1. For anexampleofthisapproach to analysis,see Tovias[1997] . 2. For arecent exampleofagravity modelused to estimatethe impactontrade flows ofthe EuroMediterraneanfree trade area withthe EU inthe caseofMorocco,see IMF [2004: 21-31] . 3. So-called ComputableG eneralEquilibrium (CGE)econometric models area lso frequently used to assess the impactofpreferentialtrade agreements. Thesecomputerized models doaim atpredictingthe dynamic effects offree trade areasonproductivity,investment,employment andothers tructuralv ariables,b ut apart from beingmuch morec omplexandthereby compoundingthe serious problems or the reliability andlack ofd ata, theirr esults are extremely sensitiveto the underlyingassumptions built into the models themselves. 4.See, for instance, the projects 'SocialDialoguea ndS ocialSystems' co-ordinated byt he Instituto perilMediterraneoinRomeand'SocialProtection inCountriesofthe Southern and Eastern Mediterranean' carried out bythe Euromed Trade Union Forum,availableat k http:// www.ccoo.es/internacional/foro.html . 5.Accordingto the agreed schedulefor tariff dismantling, tariffsincapitalgoodsimports withno localcompetition aredismantled inthe first years ofthe transition period, whereastariffson locally produced consumergoodso nly begint obe suppressed aftert he eighthyearo f the transitoryp eriod(see Table1) . Dueto thiss chedule, overt he first eighty ears ofthe implementation ofE MFTAseffectiveprotection ofnationally produced goods-thatis, the difference betweennationalpricesandinternationalpricesdueto trade protection -d oes increase, makingthemmorecompetitive, since theywill still enjoy the samelevelofprotection for theirproducts,withouthavingto paytariffsfor imported inputs andcapitalgoods. So,the net impactonthe competitiveness oflocalfirms will actually be positiveduringthe first years,and only afterthe eighthyearwill nationalproduction begintobe negatively affected. 6. Equivalent to the supply andd emandf unctions andpricesast he conversion factor of quantitiesinto monetary valuesused for analysingthe effects offree trade on trade flows and welfarea tl arge int he standardtheory ofi nternationalt rade.Thisl ack ofacomprehensive modelexplains to alarge extent whyeconomic andsocialr ights havereceived so little attention from economists,whohavef ocused theiranalysiso nt rade andi nvestment flows, which are, int hemselves,only intermediatevariables. 7. If atall,the best andso farthe only synthetic indicator ofeconomic andsocialrights athandis the HumanDevelopment Index,e laborated since 1990 byt he United Nations Development Fund [UNDP, 2003a] . 8.The financials trengthofthe statei sak eyfactor for socialande conomic rights,since ultimately itisthe statethatguaranteesthem,beitthrough regulation or through expenditure. 9. Indeed, 'evidence suggests thatt he agreementshavenot yetenabled thesec ountriest ogain marketshareint he EU' [DasguptaandN abli, 2003:208-9] . 10. Thiss tudydoesn ot considert he possibility ofthe association agreementsn ot being implemented accordingto theirprovisions nor ofnon-tariff barriers substitutingfor tariffsasa wayo ff endingoff foreignp roducts from localm arkets (lengthyanduncertaincustoms proceduresandh ighly inefficient logisticals ystems seemt obe salient obstaclest ot rade expansion inthe region,andcouldeventually be manipulated bygovernmentsandlocalactors to deterimports). 11. For anextensivediscussion ofthe relationshipbetweentrade liberalization andemployment andpolicym easurest hatcoulde nhance the (positivemedium-term) employment effects of dismantlingtrade protection,see Dasgupta etal. [2003] .However,thisp aperdoesn ot address the question ofthe consequencesoftrade liberalization when,asthe authors admitis the casei nMPCs,ac ountry doesn ot 'riseto the challenge'o fc reatingaf avourable investment climate, which is,a st heyconclude, 'keyt or eapingthe benefits from further trade liberalization' inMPCs. Theoretically,thisr aisest he possibility oflookingf or so-called 'secondb est' solutions (thatis,wheno neofthe conditionso rassumptionso fa n optimum equilibrium -such asp erfectcompetition int he market-i sn ot satisfied, maintainingall otheroptimum conditions-for example, free trade withthe rest ofthe world -will not lead to the best economic results undertheseconditions. Sotoreach this'second best' equilibrium itm ightbe rational,short oftakingmeasurest os uppress thism arket imperfection,to removesomeothero ptimum conditions (for instance, applyingselective trade protection). 12. Rathertothe contrary,asargued inMartín [2001] , asaconsequence ofthe so-called hub-andspokeseffect. 13. Current unemployment ratesarea neasily available, very approximateproxy for the riskof unemployment int he comingyears. Italso dependso ndemographic trendsandon the capacity oflocalfirms to copewithincreased competition,thatis,on theircompetitiveness. 14.Thisfall inthe birthratecouldbepartly explained bythe socio-economic crisisitself [Sajoux BenSeddik, 2002:19] . 15.Nos pecialattention isp aid int hiss tudyt ot he genderdimension ofthe socialimpacto f EMFTAs. However,i tisimportant to notethatw omenaretypically the socialgroup worst affected byad eterioration ineconomic andsocialr ights,particularly inArab countries. Anotherquestion not addressed inthisstudyisthatofthe differentiated territorialimpactof EMFTAsw ithint he samec ountry:i ndeed, therei ss olid evidence oftrade liberalization exacerbatingthe economic gapbetweenr uralandurbanareas,f or instance, int he caseof Mexico. Of course, bothphenomenaquestion the observation ofoneofthe basic legal principlesofeconomic andsocialrights:the principleofnon-discrimination. 16. Author's calculation,assumingthatthe unemployment rateismaintained,on the basisofthe labour force projections contained int he FEMISE report. 17. Itw ill be noted thatall referencest ot he socialconsequenceso fE MFTAst alkofsocial 'impact',not 'contribution'. 18.For apaperattemptingto sustaint hisv ieww ithe mpiricals tudies,see Rama[ 2001:4-7] .
However,thiss tudyisbased on ac lassification ofi nternationalcountriesaccordingto their degree ofg lobalization,showingh ow wageshavetended to registerah igherincreasei n 'globalizer' countriest hanin' non-globalizers' duringthe 1980s and1990s. Thisapproach ignoresthe factthatsofar'globalizer' countriesweremainly the most competitivecountries from the outset,whereastrade liberalization inMPCsinvolvesopeningup countriesthatare notoriouslyn on-competitivei ninternationalm arkets. Actually,thiss tudyitselfprovest hat most ofthe increasei nw agesisdueto the entry off oreigndirectinvestment int hose 'globalizer' countries. But evenaccordingto thisapproach, the impactoftrade liberalization on wagesisn egativeovert he short term (aroundthree to four years; see Figure2o fthis paper). The conclusion ist hat,'if the openingup ofthe economy fails to attractforeign capital,wage lossescouldbesizeable'(p.6). 19. For example, inthe form ofincreased creditriskpremiums or tighterconditions for receiving credits from internationalagencies. 20. Thiswasthe caseinTunisia, whereageneralvalueadded taxwasestablished in1988 to offset the anticipated loss ofstaterevenues; Algeria andMoroccoalso tookasimilarstepinthe late 1980s. Lebanon,the country most vulnerableto the loss oftariff revenue, which makesupa thirdofa ll staterevenue, followed suitbyintroducingV AT in2 002. The consequence has beenasuddenhike inprices. 21. Trade liberalization hasafurtherindirectnegativeimpactonstaterevenuesthrough the fall of payroll taxesdueto the loss ofj obsandthe reduction ofthe taxbasei nduced byt he substitution ofimports for locally-produced products,but thiseffectismuch moredifficult to estimate(for adiscussion ofthisissue, see Abed, 1998 : 7-8). 22. Figures3and4havebeeninspired byZaafraneandMahjoub[2000 , but apart from using updated data, somevariations havebeenintroduced(for instance, usingpublic debtinstead of public deficitasanindicator offi scalv ulnerability). The sizeofpublic debtdeterminest he capacity ofthe stateto haverecourseto financialm arkets to finance andsustainits public deficit. 23. Hunt [2003:16-21] Mold[2002] . providesan extensivereviewofquantitativeanalysesofthe impactofEMFTAsonthe welfareofMPCs. Thesestudiesgivee stimatesfor welfareg ains induced byEMFTAs,ranging, dependingon assumptions,from slightly positiveto significantly negative, particularly duringthe transitory period. 26. For adiscussion ofthe impactofthe EMP on FDI flows to MPCs,see Martín[2001] . 27. Accordingto Jaidi [2002] , only 7p ercent oftotalMoroccanimports werea ffected by immediatetariff dismantlingasthe association agreement entered into effectin2000,20 per cent ofthe imports wereaffected bytariff dismantlinginthe three years up to March 2003 and another21percent will be affected bythe rest ofthe tariff dismantling.The rest ofMoroccan imports eitherdonot comefrom the EU or concern products not subjecttothe free trade area (especially agricultureproducts). 28. Tourkmani[2003] .Thisamount -morethan$650m ayear-represents apermanent revenue loss for the government. 
